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AUTHOR	Waldinger, Roger
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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses controversy over the relevance of the past for understanding immigrant trajectories of today. While one interpretation says that the past and present fundamentally diverge (such that a substantial portion of today's newcomers are unlikely to climb up and into the American social order in the fashion experienced in previous years), another interpretation suggests that the country is not easily rid of the past. This paper disagrees with a suggested construction of the past that is influenced by both presentism and continued reliance on justly influential but intrinsically time-bound interpretations. It asserts that the terms majority, ethnic group, and minority have meant different things over the years, which implies considerable revision in understandings of the distinctiveness of America's encounter with today's versus yesterday's immigrants. Yesterday's immigrants encountered a highly ethnicized majority. They lacked the cultural and intellectual resources needed for a self-conscious ethnic assertion and were linked to organizations that redirected loyalties in other ways. By contrast, today's newcomers enter a society transformed by an earlier civil rights struggle, the results of which democratized and enlarged the civic nation, expanding the understanding of what it means to be American. The paper concludes that today's immigrants are likely to remake the country in ways more fundamental and far-reaching than did their predecessors. (SM)

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Henry Hart Rice Urban Policy Forum

The Remaking of America and Immigrants: Old and New

Dr. Roger Waldinger

Professor and Chair
Department of Sociology
University of California, Los Angeles

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The migrations of the turn of the *last* century transformed America and transfixed its social science observers. But now that we've crossed into the 21st century, it is clear that Italian-, Polish-, and all the other hyphenated Americas with sources in the old world, are about to expire. Yes, we can still find Bensonhursts and North Ends, but these examples simply distract us from the main drift. The once swarthy immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, first known as "racial minorities" and only later as "white ethnics," are now steadily gravitating toward the rootless sunbelt suburbs, there to be transformed into a much blander Anglo mass. One can certainly mourn the passing of this distinctive component of American group life, but beyond nostalgia, the extent and pace of this change remind us of the extraordinary absorptive – can we say, assimilative? -- power of American society.

So much for the old. An interesting, compelling story, perhaps, but one that mainly serves the study of contemporary immigration as foil for understanding the events of today. While the stylized description offered above elicits little argument, controversy erupts over the relevance of the past for understanding the immigrant trajectories of today.

An influential, if not dominant, interpretation tells us that past and present fundamentally diverge, such that a substantial portion of today's newcomers, and their descendants, are unlikely to climb up and into the American social order in the fashion experienced in years gone by. Many of course, will do better, their parents starting out with advantages unknown by their predecessors, their children advancing at rates surpassing the most successful immigrant children of yore. Others are making a way upward in their own style, their linkages to kin and community facilitating the search for progress, an apparent exception to the model derived from meditations on the past. But our leading students nonetheless tell us that now is the time to be worried.

The anxiety involves the closest parallel to the downtrodden of old: today's low-skilled immigrants, visibly identifiable and coming from everywhere but Europe, enter a mainly white society still not cured of its racist afflictions. Changes in the structure of the economy

make matters still worse: while poorly-educated immigrant parents seem to have no trouble getting started at the very bottom, the terms of compensation have decisively shifted against the less-skilled. Most importantly, the restructuring of the U.S. economy gives the children of today's immigrants no time to play catch-up, requiring strong, and extended educational performance as the condition for moving ahead, even as deeply troubled, big-city school systems lurch from one crisis to the next.

But we are not quite so readily rid of the past, as a compelling, if not fully persuasive, counter-interpretation contends. At the very least, caution suggests that the assimilatory forces, experienced by European immigrants and their descendants, are unlikely to be spent. America, after all, is a mobile, democratic society, indeed far more so than in the past, and deeply imprinted by an ever more powerful consumer culture that breeds a powerful sense of self, even if one that is created in deeply mimetic style. Beneath today's teeming immigrant neighborhoods and burgeoning ethnic niches, the outward stream can be easily detected. As in the past, dispersion leads to the crossing of ethnic boundaries, increasing exposure probabilities to outsiders. With the move from ethnic ghetto to suburb, and the simultaneous shift from ethnic niche to the general economy, the transformation of the social structure of ethnicity -- interethnic friendships, networks, and eventually marriages -- follows in due course. The advent of structural assimilation, to borrow the influential term coined by Milton Gordon, signals entry into the "mainstream", and the beginning of the end for any distinctiveness associated with the immigrant generation.

Thus our most influential interpreters contend over the relevance of the earlier immigrant experience. Ironically, they hold a remarkably similar interpretation of that very same past. That consensus traces its origin to two sources, the presentist orientation of today's discussions, and the continuing intellectual legacy of the earlier sociology of immigration and ethnicity. On the one hand, our literature tends to look at the past from the perspective of the turn of the 21st century, at which time it is hard to imagine that the

adjustment of the last great immigration could have turned out differently. Yet this view of an inexorable move up the totem pole is certainly not how the immigrants, and their children and grandchildren experienced the process themselves. In historical analysis, hindsight rarely yields 20/20 vision: it tends to eliminate contingency, obscuring the turning points, and making the trajectory of change seem inevitable. On the other hand, the adventures of the intellectual dialectic are such that the currently dominant interpretations have inevitably been constructed in opposition to the accounts that earlier held sway. We have not yet fully historicized the earlier, once canonical accounts, allowing them to still provide the lens through which we comprehend the past. And thus our literature yields an agreed upon, but clearly distinctive construction of the past, one influenced by both presentism and continued reliance on justly influential, but intrinsically time-bound interpretations. It's that consensus with which this paper disagrees.

The Comparison in Question

Comparisons of immigration now and then typically confuse – and no wonder, since they begin in a hall of mirrors, where all one sees are reflections of a past that never was, creating images of a present that can't be. The problem begins by mistaking the prism for the past it seeks to describe. The prism, of course, is provided by "assimilation", a contested concept, if there ever was one, but one with a seemingly constant purchase on our intellectual life. Our graduate students never tire of telling us that the experience of this or that immigrant group contradicts the assimilation model, but just what they mean to say, they don't quite know. In general, they seem to be insisting that the outcomes we observe today diverge from the patterns that characterized the turn-of-the-century European immigrants, when in fact they only show that the stylized description of that experience provides a poor fit with today's reality. In effect, the case for the contrast between "now" and "then" typically proceeds by

attacking the intellectual approaches inherited from the past, which conflates the object of understanding with its interpretation.

But the central problem is quite different. While they present themselves as academic renderings, the standard social science paradigms are essentially intellectualized renderings of national and nationalistic theories of a folk kind. Not only are they inseparable from the nationalist response that emerged in reaction to the mass migration of which they purport to provide an account. More importantly, they incorporate everyday understandings of the nation, depicting it as an inherently integrated whole, in which the nation is separated and distinct from the world that's found at the edges of its borders. Looking at the matter from the standpoint of the nation-state society, our literature imagines America to be a bounded, sharply demarcated, entity, which is why it finds the appearance of strangers to be strange.

But this is precisely why our traditional accounts go wrong, mistaking cause and effect. Immigration restriction was the mechanism by which an American nation was built, providing a means for bounding a community that had previously been characterized by its connectedness to a steadily growing array of the world's people. By severing those forms of association and activity that we now call transnational communities, restriction yielded an alignment of the American state and the society of the Americans which was then unprecedented, but which we have since come to regard as normal.

However, the parenthesis was brief, as the economic networks of goods, services, information, and people that cut across any single nation-state society and other like units of the world, inevitably propelled migrants across those interactional cleavages that the American state tried so hard to create. To be sure, the migrants of the turn of the 21st century moved into a context bearing the imprint of the earlier nation-building experience: like every other modern nation state, the United States is an exclusivist community, which is why its liberalism stops at the water's edge. However, the conditions of acceptance for those lucky enough to apply for or gain membership in the national collectivity are no longer the same, for reasons

having to do with the practices and understandings distinguishing insiders from outsiders, as well as the symbolic and material resources on which immigrants can draw in their effort to determine both "who is what" and "who gets what." As I'll try to show in the remainder of this talk, "majority," ethnic group, and "minority" have meant different things now and then, which in turn implies considerable revision in our understanding of the distinctiveness of America's encounter with immigrants today as compared to the past.

Majorities Then and Now

Immigration is a euphemism of an inherently obscurantist sort; what we mean, is *international migration*, which explicitly signals a process whereby outsiders move into a territorially defined, delimited nation-state. Exclusion therefore serves as a distinguishing characteristic of liberal nationalism: universalism reigns among those lucky enough to be born within the boundaries of the nation-state, or to have somehow become its legitimate members; as for outsiders, however, it's just tough luck. Though it should be obvious, the brand of liberalism which the United States currently professes in theory, even while contradicting it in practice, is just another particularism, a fact largely unremarked by our literature. Whom we are, as a people, is largely in defined in terms of whom we are *not*

Consequently, the advent of outsiders necessarily raises the issue of their membership in the nation, and of their participation in all domains of social and civic life. In a sense, the Marxist sociology of immigration has it right: labor migration conveniently provides a group of outsiders who furnish economic contributions in such a way that they can be excluded from membership and all that it entails with little effort. But the same approach can't explain immigration's disruptive potential, since the conflicts and dilemmas generated by international migration escape the terms constructed by a Marxist account. Knowing why immigrants are welcomed as workers, doesn't explain why they turn out to be unwanted -- or at least less

popular -- once they're perceived as people. And not just people; but rather, people of a particular kind, transcending those qualities associated with their role as workers pure and simple. Put somewhat differently, immigrants are also *social* outsiders, injected by market forces that transcend both states and the nations they seek to bound. Consequently, the advent of international migration necessarily challenges established understandings as to who does and does not belong.

In some contexts, those lines of distinction may simply or mainly counterpose foreigners and nationals. Not in this country, however, where strangers need not only come from abroad. Though ours is the self-proclaimed civic nation, it has not generally been so. True American exceptionalism lies in its *ethnocratic* character: of the world's major democracies, ours was the only one to have constructed nationhood in terms that were both *externally* and *internally* contrastive, excluding both aliens as well as outsiders found within the territory of the state. Contrary to the folk theories of American society, which claim that membership is obtained through commitment, the reality has been different. Origins had always been agreed-upon criterion for distinguishing among those apt for the privileges of inclusion in the American community, and those best left outside it. But until the late 19th century, the contrastive process out of which an American people emerged principally involved separation from the unacceptable outsiders -- African Americans and American Indians -- found within the territory of the state. With the upsurge of immigration, however, preserving the national community from the aliens originating from outside the territory became no less imperative. Moreover, the immigration of the 1880-1920 period, and its long-term absorption, took place in a period of rising American nationalism, in which the United States projected itself as an increasingly self-conscious and important actor on the world stage, even as it saw itself as ever more vulnerable to the threats from overseas. In this context, the lines between internal and external sources of menace easily became blurred. Foreign threats -- whether real or perceived -- made the internal presence of foreigners all the more troubling. In a more

fervently nationalist climate, the meaning of what it meant to be American became increasingly circumscribed. At once a reaction to traits and peoples seen as unacceptably different, and an outcome that those groups categorized as "different" opposed, but proved unable to resist, the triumph of restriction shut off immigration with a "National Origins Act" that spelled out the insult that was meant to be delivered.

Restriction represented the triumph of a particular conception of the American *ethnos:* one that was fundamental, unchangeable, and derivative of only a small portion of the peoples that inhabit the territory of the United States. From the inside, looking out, only the details have changed, as the gatekeeping state remains firmly in place. While it's true that the doors open more widely now, than they did half or three quarters of a century ago, the fundamental bias has not been altered: the contemporary migration regime is intrinsically exclusionary and illiberal.

But the view within the borders of the United States takes a totally different form, precisely because the renewal of mass migration has come after the full formal democratization of the United States, of which it was in part a result. I hardly need remind you that the extension of social and economic citizenship to the formal members of the people is still incomplete. But the democratic cultural revolution, I believe, is largely complete: even if we witness atavistic flare-ups from time to time, older, ethnicized understandings and assertions of the American nation have been safely interred. In a sense, there is no such thing as an "American" anymore; rather, ours is a society of Americans of any number of types, none of which holds a monopoly on the meaning of what it is to be American. As Nathan Glazer has powerfully argued, we are now all multiculturalists, the latter replacing older forms of thinking about the American nation and enlarging the circle of the we, while also changing both the conditions under which that we is defined, and the parties involved in the discussion.

Rephrasing the matter in other terms, the current construction of America is that of a consensual nation made and re-made by people who came from somewhere else, in which

difference is not simply something to be tolerated, but celebrated, indeed appreciated by all. Needless to say, practice frequently clashes with theory, as is often the case. But the revisions in theory are so fundamental as to either constrain deviation, or, if not, at least provide persons of immigrant origins with the means for rebutting the imputation of inferiority, and overturning or deflecting the inequitable treatment that typically follows.

One could also maintain, as many have cogently argued, that the theory and practice of multiculturalism yields a regime of group rights, not simply sheltering members from pressures to exit, but also impeding them from pursuing any number of equally legitimate, alternative allegiances. But in my view, the key point is simply that today we operate with a more open, more freely contested conceptualization of American nationhood, which in turn, provides contemporary immigrants with resources to leverage membership in ways never available to their predecessors of decades ago. It also renders exclusion less legitimate than before, thereby weakening the mechanisms of social closure that hindered immigrant progress in days gone by.

Group-ness Yesterday and Today

The last great immigration was largely a peasant migration, peopled by migrants coming from a set of folk societies, not yet nationalized, and therefore not possessing the common traits and corporate sense that the nation-building project imparts. The peasant migrant had little attachment to the nation; for the most part, the relevant "homeland" was a particular local environment, with a dialect, customs, clothing, and gustatory habits sufficiently different from those of the town on the other side of the valley. The peasant migrants did transplant their distinctive "old world traits," as the literature famously tells us. But theirs was a culture largely taken for granted, rooted in custom and routine, and low in conscious articulation. Yes, the immigrants moved in chains, but the village chains didn't necessarily

overlap -- and how could they, if the villagers spoke in mutually unintelligible dialects? The circumstances of migration also did little to enhance groupness or enlarge it, with flows responding far more sensitively to the ups and downs of the business cycle than they do today, the prevalence of sojourning necessarily disrupting ties made during a stint of labor during the United States.

Though the classical literature thus speaks of ethnic groups, the reality was one of smaller aggregations, gradually expanding in scope. Thanks to the lessons taught by outsiders unable to perceive the distinctions that mattered on the other side of the ocean, immigrant villagers eventually learned that they shared something in common with others whom they initially viewed as different. But the process was exceedingly protracted: regional and hometown loyalties and jealousies remained strong, until well after the end of the great immigration itself.

Moreover, the resources required for the articulation of groupness were lacking. To be sure, every major migration contained its complement of intellectuals. But the intellectuals and political activists interested in raising the salience of ethnicity were swimming against the current: America, after all, represented the acme of modernity. How could the peasant migrants, knowing themselves to be unworthy, over-ride the Americanizers' insistent claims? Moreover, the immigrant intellectuals' own understandings of ethnicity clashed with the loyalties affirmed by the audiences to they sought to appeal. The first generation may have been culturally distinctive, but it held to a particularized, locality-based understanding of group life. The second generation was profoundly ethnic in everyday life but not in identity, as it was highly Americanized and never exposed to a self-conscious elaboration of ethnicity.

By contrast, today's immigrants arrive nationalized, fully equipped with the resources for understanding themselves as self-conscious entities of an ethnic sort. Prior to arrival on American shores, yesterday's Italians, Poles, and other Slavs knew little, if anything, of the nation to which they putatively belonged. Today's immigrants are the products of

successful nation-building projects, which is to say that internal similarities are likely to be greater, and more deeply felt, than they were before. While the comparison to the native-born population underscores the large low-skilled component among today's foreign-born, the historical contrast between immigrants then and now highlights the much greater, absolute levels of cultural capital enjoyed by almost all contemporary immigrants. Put simply, the rank and file immigrant at the turn of the 21st century has already undergone the experience of developing an abstract identification with a group of people he or she will never meet. Moreover, today's newcomers also possess the intellectual tools for doing so again in a different context. And if ethnic categories don't readily spring into being out of everyday existence, almost all of the migrations contain the human resources needed for the articulation of ethnic differences. The extraordinarily high level of education characteristic of many of today's flows implies far greater symbolic competence, than ever before, crucial for both elaborating and legitimating ethnic identities.

Thus, ethnic categories are more significant today, right from the start, because the variance within them is smaller than it was 100 or so years ago; ironically, as I've suggested above, the differences between outsiders and insiders, are also not quite as great, providing all the more incentive for mobilization along ethnic lines. Contrary to the assumptions of the assimilation approach, which contends that similarity and contact breed acceptance, one would do better to argue the opposite: exposure makes one sensitive to deprivations that one wouldn't have noticed with greater distance. The high symbolic competence, which so many immigrants share with the native-born, facilitates the elaboration of a collective identity designed, only in part, to preserve a threatened "ethnic culture." But since it is not just stigmatization that threatens ethnic "cultures", but the attempts, by immigrants and their descendants to change their own lives, ethnic identities get fashioned out of entirely new stuff. In the end, today's immigrants can mount a far more effective challenge to prevailing notions

of what it means to be an American, precisely because they've so fully absorbed the codes of the dominant group.

Ethnic "Minorities" Then and Now

We used to think about migrants as "the uprooted," to quote Oscar Handlin's famous immigration history of four decades ago; we now describe them as "the transplanted," to a cite a slightly less celebrated, but no less influential history produced twenty-five years later. The shifting metaphors of scholarly discourse about migration convey the essence of the new approach: we now understand that migrants don't move as solo adventurers but rather as actors linked to associates here and there, with the ties lubricating and structuring their transition from one society to the next. But this crucial insight, for all of its power and fruitfulness, has yet to be fully developed. Immigrants' *personal* networks are contained in a broader relational matrix that attach newcomers to organizations and institutions at varying levels of social life. On the one hand, those connections reflect similarities of class, religion, gender, and politics, which immigrants share with others of different ethnic origins. On the other hand, these same associations link immigrants to institutions, exposing them to pressures that rearrange social life, while also making competing claims on identity. In effect, the relational matrix of ethnic life sets the stage for conflict over the various categorical identities -- class, ethnic, religious, regional, and national -- that immigrants might embrace. It is precisely this relational matrix that provides yet another, generally unexplored, axis distinguishing the immigrations of today from those of the past.

Disorganization was the dominant theme of the sociology that emerged in response to the immigration of the 1880-1920 period. But there were other, discordant themes, highlighting the importance of the mediating institutions that re-organized the fabric of immigrant life. Our current discussions of past/present differences usually emphasize class and

national origins, highlighting the greater class diversity of today's immigrants, on the one hand, and the very different national origins on the other. But we neglect religion, then, as now, a salient aspect of the ethnic experience. Today's religiously diverse immigrants are at once introducing unparalleled religious heterogeneity into American life, while also entering a religious universe characterized by especially high levels of religious innovation and competition. Religious diversity was not unknown in the past: the immigrants of the 1880-1920 period gave Judaism and a variety of brands of eastern Orthodoxy a far higher profile on the American scene than had been previously the case. But if the new immigrants were seen as "others", it was largely because, as in the case of the Poles and the Italians, they were Catholics, albeit of a somewhat different sort than their earlier arrived co-religionists. They entered cities where the earlier Catholic migrations peopled by arrivals from Ireland and Germany left a legacy of highly structured, deeply hierarchical institutions that strove to remake both the religious practices that the immigrants imported, and the loyalties they developed.

To be sure, the encounter between the immigrants and the Catholic church was deeply conflicted. But it was also unequal, as the resources of the controlling institutions were always so much greater than those of the immigrants, who acted in parallel, but rarely organized ways. In the short term, immigrant practices and preferences often prevailed; in the long term customary preferences withered, as gradual upward mobility, and spatial diffusion pushed immigrants and their descendants into an institutional framework not of their own choosing. The practices and beliefs that the immigrants brought with them linked them to an organization that sought, at once, to re-arrange those ties, reduce the internal differences rooted in diverse home country origins, and transcend them altogether through a categorical identity rooted around the far more universal institutions of the Catholic church. In the end, that effort can only be judged a success, consolidating ethnic loyalties in a broader religious admixture of neighborhood and faith, highly institutionalized through church and parish school.

When not communing with God, the former peasants, artisans, and petty shopkeepers who arrived in the United States at the turn of the last century worked, and in jobs a good deal more modest, and more far more similar to one another than is true for the immigrants of today. Noting the greater social class diversity of today's immigrants, as we usually do, doesn't quite get at the nub of the matter. Our older understandings of class told us a story in which immigrant workers' shared attributes and interests would lead them to act in concert, and ultimately to identify as members of a working-class, transcending the pre-market differences of nationality or ethnicity. But what the older understandings left out is that class, expressed in precisely these terms, was also the idiom that the immigrants encountered. As such, class also encompassed the practices of the working-class institutions – unions and the various, influential groups of labor radicals, many of the latter foreign-born themselves -- that met the immigrants in their workplaces and neighborhoods. "Americanization from the bottom up" provides one way of understanding the reconfiguration of ethnicity, and the displacement of ethnic to class-based activities and allegiances. But we shouldn't think of Americanization of this sort as if it were simply a spontaneous upsurge. Rather, class offered a more powerful vocabulary for organizing experiences, and only in part because the old world origins and status of the migrants were the source of shame. It also offered something to the elites that emerged from foreign-born ranks -- namely an expansive view of a future at once better and beyond the cramped quarters of immigrant life. Thus as workers, the immigrants and their immediate descendants found their allegiances and networks reshaped by organizations that consciously sought to replace class for ethnic commonalities.

Contemporary immigrants certainly work and worship, but as I've already suggested, they pursue these efforts in more diverse ways, and in an organizational matrix less structured, and far more individuated than the world encountered by the immigrants of years past. Religious loyalties are more contested; religious institutions, like other contemporary organizations, are also far more ready to accommodate to immigrants' imported practices and

preferences, having already gone in that same direction in the non-immigrant world. The working-class institutional life of the first half of the twentieth century has largely expired, with only the unions still alive, though far more bureaucratized than before and deeply embattled.

So today's distinctive relational matrix implies that religious or class categories are less likely to substitute for ethnic identities than in the past; but contemporary immigrants can pursue an option not open to their predecessors – that is, to act and identify as members of a minority group. The decisive factor is simply that contemporary international migration to the United States has occurred in the aftermath the civil rights revolution. That transformation provided both a new understanding of the relationship between insider and outsider groups, and an organizational matrix around which that understanding could be put into place. In the example elaborated by African-Americans during the 1960s, organizations either arising from or appealing to the various new immigrant populations found both a model of action and an interpretation of their experience that they could use to make claims against the state. In the post civil rights era, broad ethnic categories became a basis for allocating both state and private resources, which increased the incentives for mobilizing around those ethnic identities with public recognition -- regardless of their alignment with the identities relevant in the home country or those that are salient in the immigrant's everyday interactions. Moreover, once black became beautiful, being an ethnic of any sort could also be a source of pride, in part because the values of the dominant group had been shown to be a sham. Consequently, inversion could be utilized in self-conscious and efficacious ways, with stigma at once revalued as the positive pole of one's identity, but also turned around, forcing the stigmatizers to confront their own shameful deeds.

Put somewhat differently, African-Americans "discovered" a mobilizing principle, of great strategic efficacy, and an innovation that was immediately copied by other groups, notwithstanding the fact that their own situations, while somewhat analogous, were nonetheless quite different. That the older, European-origin groups failed to act similarly has

less to do with the inherent qualities of the groups, as opposed to timing. First, the strategy had not yet been invented. Second, those categories that derived from the immigrants' national or ethnic origins had no official standing. And third, returning to the ethnic majority, it was not yet ready to acknowledge the views and experiences of outsiders, let alone make concessions to those that would question its civilizing mission.

Conclusion

In a sense, the theme of this paper departs from the title of an article by the great Jewish historian Salo Baron, who argued forcefully against the "lachrymose interpretation of Jewish history." The history of the various outsider groups deriving from immigration certainly offers plenty of reason for tears, indeed one of the main reasons why I've been so sharply critical of the intellectual legacy which we have all inherited. But we also know that even the weak have weapons, resistance manifesting itself in everyday life, if not in concerted efforts to gain dignity and assert, through efforts both practical and large, a different vision of one's place in the world. Thus, insiders are not quite as strong as they might think, nor are outsiders quite as powerless as they might imagine.

Power matters since the advent of immigration has persistently forced America to rethink how wide is the circle of the we. As I've argued above, the immigrant outsiders of old entered this game with a relatively weak card to play, encountering a highly ethnicized majority, lacking the cultural and intellectual resources needed for a self-conscious ethnic assertion, and linked to organizations that redirected loyalties and allegiances in other ways. By contrast, today's newcomers have the good fortune of encountering a society transformed by an earlier civil rights struggle, the results of which democratized and enlarged the civic nation, expanding our understanding of what it means to be American, while also leaving the question in balance. Contemporary immigrants have the resources to enter that contest

effectively, arriving fully ethnicized, often enjoying high symbolic competence, and benefiting from a highly efficacious, and new model of group mobilization. In the end, therefore, today's immigrants are likely to remake America, in ways more fundamental and far-reaching than their predecessors ever imagined. Good news for all of us, I believe, and yet another reason why the study of immigration is likely to yield particularly rich fruit in years to come.

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